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Oil price shocks have figured prominently U.S. business cycles since the end of World 
War II—although the relationship seems to have weakened during the 1990s.  In addition 
the economy appears to respond asymmetrically to oil price shocks, rising oil prices hurt 
economic activity more than falling oil prices help it.  This section of the Encyclopedia of 
Energy sorts through an extensive economics literature that relates oil price shocks to 
aggregate economic activity.  It examines how oil price shocks create business cycles, 
why they seem to have a disproportionate effect on economic activity, why the economy 
responds asymmetrically to oil prices, and why the relationship between oil prices and 
economic activity may have weakened.  It also addresses the issue of developing energy 
policy to mitigate the economic effects of oil price shocks. 
 
 
I.  Business Cycles and the Role of Energy Prices 
 
  Despite occasional periods of notable recession, the U.S. economy has generally 
traveled an expansionary path throughout its history.  In fact, U.S. gross domestic product 
(GDP) has averaged a 3.6 percent annual rate of increase since 1929.  Population 
increases account for some of the growth, but productivity gains have also been essential 
to long-term national economic growth. 
 
Although the U.S. economy has 
generally expanded over time, its upward 
trend  has not been free of interruption.  
Shocks have occasionally hit the U.S. 
economy disrupting the expansionary 
forces and creating business cycles.  Since 
World War II, oil price shocks have played 
a significant role in U.S. business cycles.  
In fact, rising oil prices preceded nine of 
the ten recessions that occurred from the 
end of World War II through 2002 (Figure 
1).  Research conducted by James 
Hamilton (University of California, San 
Diego) strongly suggests that the recessions 
that followed sharply rising oil prices were 
not the result of other business cycle 
variables, such as aggregate demand shocks 
or contractionary monetary policy. 
 
Episodes of sharply rising oil prices (shown as the 
highlighted portions of oil prices) have preceded nine of 
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Figure 1: Real Oil Prices and U.S. Recessions  2
In examining the influence of oil price shocks on U.S. economic activity in the six 
decades since the end of World War II, economists have found that oil price shocks seem 
to have a disproportionate effect on economic activity.  In addition, the economy appears 
to responds asymmetrically to oil price movements—that is, the gains in economic 
activity that follow oil price declines are not commensurate with the losses in economic 
activity that follow oil price increases.  In addition, oil price shocks seem to have had less 
effect on economic activity during the 1990s than in previous decades. 
 
These observations suggest a number of questions.  What basic factors account 
for the negative influence that sharply rising oil prices have on U.S. economic activity?  
Why do sharply rising oil prices have disproportionate effect in weakening reducing 
economic activity?  Why doesn’t the economy respond as favorably to falling oil prices 
as it responds unfavorably to rising oil prices?  Why has the economy become less 
sensitive to oil price shocks?  And, how does our understanding of the effect of oil price 
shocks on economic activity shape desired energy policies? 
 
 
II.  Understanding the Basic Response 
 
  The oil price shock of 1973 and the subsequent recession, which (at the time) was 
the longest of the post-WWII recessions, gave rise to many studies about the effects of oil 
price increases on the economy.  The early research documented and sought to explain 
the inverse relationship between oil price increases and aggregate economic activity.  
Subsequent empirical studies confirmed an inverse relationship between oil prices and 
aggregate economic activity for the United States and other countries.  The latter research 
included James Hamilton’s findings (published in the Journal of Political Economy) that 
other economic forces could not account for the negative effect that rising oil prices had 
on U.S. economic activity. 
 
Economists have offered a number of explanations for why rising oil prices hurt 
aggregate U.S. economic activity.  The most basic explanation is the classic supply shock 
in which rising oil prices are indicative of the reduced availability of an important input 
to production.  Another explanation is that rising oil prices result in income transfers 
from oil-importing nations to oil-exporting nations which reduces U.S. aggregate demand 
and slows economic activity. 
 
The remaining explanations sought to attribute the effects of oil price shocks to 
developments in the financial markets.  One is simply that the monetary authorities 
responded to rising oil prices with a contractionary monetary policy that boosted interest 
rates. Another is that rising oil prices led to increased money demand as people sought to 
rebalance their portfolios toward liquidity.  A failure of the monetary authority to meet 
growing money demand with an increased money supply boosted interest rates.  In either 
case, rising interest rates retarded economic activity. 
 
Sorting through the explanations that economists have offered for the inverse 
relationship between oil prices and economic activity requires a comparison between how   3
the economy has responded to oil price shocks historically, and how the various 
explanations would suggest the economy should respond.  In the United States past 
episodes of rising oil prices have generally resulted in falling GDP, a higher price level, 
and higher interest rates (Table 1).  As is shown below, of the various explanations that 
have been offered for why rising oil prices hurt economic activity, only the classic 
supply-side effect can account for falling GDP, a rising price level and higher interest 
rates. 
Table 1 
Expected Responses to Rising Oil Price 
  Real GDP  Price Level  Interest Rate 
Historical Record  Down Up Up 
Classic Supply Shock  Down Up Up 
Aggregate Demand Shock  Down  Down Down 
Monetary Shock  Down  Down  Up 
Real Balance Effect  Down  Down  Up 
 
 
A Classic Supply Shock 
  
Many economists consider an oil price shock to be illustrative of a classic supply 
shock that reduces output.  Elevated energy prices are a manifestation of increased 
scarcity of energy, which is a basic input to production.  With reduced inputs with which 
to work, output and labor productivity are reduced.  (In more mild cases, the growth of 
output and productivity are slowed.)  In turn, the decline in productivity growth reduces 
real wage growth and increases the unemployment rate. 
 
If consumers expect such a rise in oil prices to be temporary, or if they expect the 
near-term effects of output to be greater than the long-term effects, they will attempt to 
smooth their consumption by saving less or borrowing more.  These actions boost the real 
interest rate.  With reduced output and a higher real interest rate, the demand for real cash 
balances falls and the price level increases (for a given rate of growth in the monetary 
aggregate).  Therefore, higher oil prices reduce real GDP, boost real interest rates and 
increase the price level (Table 1).  The expected consequences of a classic supply shock 
are consistent with the historical record. 
 
Income Transfers and Reduced Aggregate Demand 
 
When oil prices rise, there is a shift in purchasing power from the oil-importing 
nations to the oil-exporting nations.  Such a shift is another avenue through which oil 
price shocks could affect U.S. economic activity.  Rising oil prices can be thought of as 
being similar to a tax that is collected from oil-importing nations by oil-exporting nations.  
The rise in oil prices reduces purchasing power and consumer demand in the oil-
importing nations.  At the same time, rising oil prices increases purchasing power and 
consumer demand in the oil-exporting nations.  Historically, however, the increase in 
consumer demand occurring in oil exporting nations has been less than the reduction in 
consumer demand in the oil-importing nations.  On net, world consumer demand for 
goods produced in the oil-importing nations is reduced. 
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Reduced consumer demand for goods produced in the oil importing nations 
increases the world supply of savings, which puts downward pressure on interest rates.  
Lower interest rates could stimulate investment, partially offsetting the lost consumption 
spending, and partially restoring aggregate demand.  The net result, however, is a 
reduction in aggregate demand. 
 
The reduction in aggregate demand puts downward pressure on the price level. 
Economic theory suggests that real prices will continue falling until aggregate demand 
and GDP are restored to pre-shock levels.  If nominal prices are sticky downward, as 
most economists believe they are however, the process of adjustment will not take place, 
and aggregate demand and GDP will not be restored—unless unexpected inflation 
increases as much as GDP growth falls. 
 
The reduction in aggregate demand necessitates a lower real price level to yield a 
new equilibrium.  If the real price level cannot fall, consumption spending will fall by 
more than investment spending increases. Consequently, aggregate demand and output 
are reduced.  With nominal prices downward sticky, the only mechanism through which 
the necessary reduction in real prices can occur is through unexpected inflation that is at 
least as great as the reduction in GDP growth.  Domestically, the necessary change in 
inflation can be accomplished through a monetary policy that holds the growth of 
nominal GDP constant.  A monetary policy that allows nominal GDP to fall will not 
generate enough unexpected inflation to restore aggregate demand and output.   
 
To the extent that income transfers and reduced aggregate demand account for the 
aggregate effects of oil price shocks, monetary policy would have to allow nominal GDP 
to fall.  The aggregate effects would be lower interest rates, reduced real GDP, and 
inflation that fell or increased by by less than the reduction in real GDP growth (Table 1).  
These effects are inconsistent with the historical record for the United States, which 
shows that interest rates rise, real GDP falls, and the price level increases by as much as 
real GDP falls.  Such a record seems to indicate that the effects of income transfers are 




Monetary policy was prominent among the early explanations of how oil price 
shocks affected aggregate economic activity, but it was gradually supplanted by real 
business cycle theory, which attributed the effects to a classic supply shocks rather than 
monetary policy.  Nevertheless, an apparent breakdown in the relationship between oil 
and the economy during the 1980s and 1990s led researchers to question the pure supply 
shock theory of real business cycle models and to revisit other channels through which oil 
could affect the economy, such as changes in monetary policy. 
 
Nonetheless, monetary policy is a difficult way to explain the basic effects of oil 
price shocks on aggregate economic activity.  Restrictive monetary policy will result in 
rising interest rates, reduced GDP growth, reduced inflation, and reduced nominal GDP 
growth (Table 1).  That is inconsistent with the historical record.   5
The Real Balance Effect 
  
  The real balance effect was one of the first explanations that economists offered 
for the aggregate economic effects of an oil price.  Under this theory, an increase in oil 
prices led to increased money demand as people sought to rebalance their portfolios 
toward liquidity. The failure of the monetary authority to meet growing money demand 
with an increased money supply would boost interest rates and retard economic growth, 
just like a reduction in the money supply.  Adjustment would put downward pressure on 
the price level.  The effects would be higher interest rates, lower GDP, and a reduced 
price level, which is inconsistent with the historical record (Table 1). 
 
Sorting Through the Basic Theories 
 
Of the explanations offered for the inverse relationship between oil price shocks 
and GDP growth, the classic supply-side shock argument best explains the historical 
record (Table 1).  The classic supply shock explains the inverse relationship between oil 
prices and real GDP and the positive relationship between oil price shocks and measured 
increases in inflation and interest rates. Income transfers that reduce aggregate demand 
can explain reduced GDP, but cannot explain rising interest rates.  Neither monetary 
policy or the real balance effect can explain both slowing GDP growth and increased 
inflationary pressure. 
 
III.  Amplification of the Basic Response 
 
A number of economists have recognized that basic supply shock effects can 
account for only a portion of the intense effect that oil price shocks have on aggregate 
economic activity.  Consequently, additional explanations for the intensity of the 
response are important.  Among the possible explanations are restrictive monetary policy, 




Monetary policy can shape how an oil price shock is experienced.  When the 
monetary authorities hold the growth of nominal GDP constant, the inflation rate will 
accelerate at the same rate at which real GDP growth slows.  To the extent that the 
market is slow to adjust to monetary surprises, a more accommodative monetary policy, 
which is accomplished by reducing interest rates, would temporarily offset or partially 
offset the losses in real GDP while it increased inflationary pressure.  A counter-
inflationary (restrictive) monetary policy, which is accomplished by increasing interest 
rates, would temporarily intensify the losses in real GDP while it reduced inflationary 
pressure. 
 
In the case of counter-inflationary monetary policy, adjustment could be lengthy.  
If nominal wages and prices are sticky downward, real wages and prices would fail to fall 
as is necessary to clear the markets.  Consequently, unemployment would rise, aggregate   6
consumption would fall, and GDP growth would be slowed beyond that which would 
arise directly from the supply shock. 
 
If wages are nominally sticky downward, the reduction in GDP growth will lead 
to increased unemployment and a further reduction in GDP growth—unless unexpected 
inflation increases as much as GDP growth falls.  The initial reduction in GDP growth is 
accompanied by a reduction in labor productivity.  Unless real wages fall by as much as 
the reduction in labor productivity, firms will lay off workers, which will generate 
increased unemployment and exacerbate GDP losses.  Therefore, if nominal wages are 
sticky downward, the only mechanism through which the necessary wage reduction can 
occur is through unexpected inflation that is at least as great as the reduction in GDP 
growth. 
Several lines of research assert that restrictive monetary policy accounts for much 
of the decline in aggregate economic activity following an oil price increase.  In two 
related pieces of research, Douglas Bohi (Resources for the Future) reasoned that energy-
intensive industries should be most affected if a classic supply shock explains the 
principal effects of oil price shocks.  Using industry data for four countries, Bohi found 
no relationship between the industries affected and their energy intensity.  He also found 
inconsistent effects of oil price shocks across countries and time.  Asserting that 
monetary policy was tightened in each of the countries he examined, Bohi concluded that 
much of the negative impact of higher oil prices on output must be restrictive monetary 
policy. 
 
Similarly, Ben Bernanke, Mark Gertler and Mark Watson (Princeton, New York 
University, and Princeton, respectively) had an article published in the Brookings Papers 
on Economic Activity that shows the U.S. economy responds differently to an oil price 
shock when the federal funds rate is constrained to be constant than in the case in which 
it is unconstrained.  In their unconstrained case, a sharp increase in oil prices leads to a 
higher federal funds rate and a reduction in real GDP.  With the federal funds rate held 
constant, Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (hereafter BGW) find that an oil price increase 
leads to an increase in real GDP.  Defining neutral monetary policy as holding the federal 
funds rate constant, BGW find that monetary policy has tightened in response to 
increased oil prices, and they conclude that this monetary tightening accounts for the 
fluctuations in aggregate economic activity. 
 
Despite some findings to the contrary, other research casts doubt on the idea that 
monetary policy accounts for much of the response of aggregate economic activity to oil 
price shocks.  In an article that is forthcoming in the Journal of Money Credit and 
Banking, James Hamilton and Ana Maria Herrera (University of California, San Diego 
and Michigan State University, respectively) show the BGW findings are sensitive to 
specification.  Using a longer lag length, Hamilton and Herrera find oil price shocks have 
a substantially larger direct effect on the real economy.  Furthermore, with the longer lag 
lengths, Hamilton and Herrera find that even when the federal funds rate is kept constant, 
an oil price shock still yields a sizable reduction in output, which implies that monetary 
policy has little effect in easing the real consequences of an oil price shock. 
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Hamilton and Herrera’s findings are consistent with previous research conducted 
by others that shows counter-inflationary monetary policy was only partly responsible for 
the real effects of oil price shocks from 1970 to 1990.  Some researchers agree that 
monetary policy has become more restrictive following an oil price shock, but conclude 
oil price shocks had a stronger and more significant impact on real activity than monetary 
policy. 
 
Writing in the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas’ Economic and Financial Review, 
Stephen Brown and Mine Yücel go farther by arguing that U.S. monetary policy likely 
has had no role in aggravating the effects of past oil price shocks.  Using a specification 
similar to BGW’s, Brown and Yücel find that oil price shocks lead to an increased federal 
funds rate, reduced real GDP, and an increased price level.  The increase in the price 
level is about the same as the reduction in real GDP, which means nominal GDP is 
unchanged.  Such a finding conforms to Robert Gordon’s definition of monetary 
neutrality, which is achieved when monetary policy is adjusted to hold nominal GDP 
constant. 
 
Brown and Yücel also criticize the assertion that an unchanged federal funds rate 
necessarily represents a neutral monetary policy.  They find that holding the federal funds 
rate constant (in a counterfactual experiment) after an oil price shock boosts real GDP, 
the price level, and nominal GDP, which is consistent with Gordon’s definition of 
accommodative monetary policy.  In short, monetary policy can cushion the real effects 
of an oil price shock, but at the expense of accelerating inflation. 
 
The use of the fed-funds rate to gauge the stance monetary policy can be faulty 
when the economy is adjusting to a supply shock.  As explained above, the attempt by 
consumers to smooth consumption in response to a basic supply shock accounts for the 
higher interest rates.  In a market with rising interest rates, a policy of holding the fed-
funds rate constant will accelerate money growth, contributing to short term gains in real 
GDP and increased inflationary pressure. 
 
In summation, oil price shocks create the potential for a monetary policy response 
that exacerbates the basic effects of an oil supply shock.  The research assessing whether 
monetary policy has amplified the basic effects of a supply shock is contradictory, but the 
most compelling evidence suggests monetary policy has had a relatively small or no role 
in amplifying the basic effects in the United States.  Furthermore, interest rates are not a 
good way to assess the stance of monetary policy when there is a supply shock, and 





Adjustment costs are another way in which the basic response to rising oil prices 
might be amplified.  Adjustment costs could arise from either captial stock that embodies 
energy technology or sectoral imbalances.  In either case, adjustment costs could further 
retard economic activity.   8
 
To a great extent, the technology a firm chooses for its production is embedded in 
the capital equipment it purchases.  (Economists refer to this characteristic of technology 
and capital as “putty-clay” because the firm can vary its energy-to-output, capital-to-
output, and labor-to-output ratios over the long run as it purchases capital, but not in the 
short run.)  With production technology embedded in the capital stock, a firm must 
change its capital stock to respond to rising energy prices.  The consequence is slow 
adjustment and a disruption to economic organization when energy prices rise, with 
stronger effects in the near term than the long term. 
 
In a similar way, changes in oil prices could also create sectoral imbalances by 
changing the equilibrium relationship between the sectors.  For example, rising oil prices 
would require a contraction of energy-intensive sectors and an expansion of the energy-
efficient sectors.  These realignments in production require adjustments that cannot be 





Coordination problems are a potential outgrowth of sectoral imbalances.  
Coordination problems arise when individual firms understands how changing oil prices 
affect their own output and pricing decisions, but lack enough information about how 
other firms will respond to changes in oil prices.  As a consequence, firms experience 
difficulty adjusting to each other’s actions and economic activity is further disrupted 
when oil prices rise. 
 
Uncertainty and Financial Stress 
 
Uncertainty about future oil prices increases when oil prices are volatile, and such 
uncertainty reduces investment.  When firms are uncertain about future oil prices, they 
will find it increasingly desirable to postpone irreversible investment decisions.  When 
technology is embedded in the capital, the firm must irreversibly choose the energy-
intensity of its production process when purchasing its capital.  As uncertainty about 
future oil prices increases, the value of postponing the investment decision increases, and 
the net incentive to invest decreases.   In addition, uncertainty about how firms might fare 
in an environment of higher energy prices is likely to reduce investor confidence and 
increase the interest rates that firms must pay for capital.  Together, these two effects 
work to reduce investment spending and weaken economic activity. 
 
Sorting through the explanations 
  
The currently available research has not reached a consensus about why the 
effects of rising oil prices are so strong.  The most recent research casts doubt on the idea 
that monetary policy is the primary factor amplifying the aggregate economic effects of 
oil price shocks.  No empirical research has attempted to sort through the other effects— 
adjustment costs, coordination problems, and financial stress.  In fact, these effects are   9
consistent with observed facts and are mutually reinforcing, rather than mutually 
exclusive.  All three effects may be at work. 
 
 
IV.  The Asymmetry of the Response 
 
Prior to the 1980s, the large shocks in oil prices were increases.  The 1980s 
brought the first big decrease in oil prices, and it gradually became evident that U.S. 
economic activity responded asymmetrically to oil price shocks.  That is, rising oil prices 
hurt U.S. economic activity by more than falling oil prices helped it.  Although all but 
one of the post-World-War-II recessions followed sharp rises in oil prices, accelerated 
economic activity did not follow the sharp price declines of the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
The Discovery of Asymmetry 
 
Initially, the weak response of economic activity to oil price decreases was seen 
as a breakdown in the relationship between oil price movements and the economy, and 
researchers began to examine different oil-price specifications in their empirical work to 
reestablish the relationship between oil price shocks and economic activity.  In research 
published in The Energy Journal, Knut Mork found that when he separated oil price 
changes into negative and positive oil price changes, oil price increases had more effect 
on economic activity than oil price decreases.  Later research conducted by others found 
that oil price increases had a significant effect on economic activity while oil prices 
decreases did not.  Similar asymmetry was also found at a more detailed industry level, 
and further research established that economic activity in seven industrialized countries 
responded asymmetrically to oil price movements. 
 
Writing for the Journal of Monetary Economics, James Hamilton (University of 
California, San Diego) further refined the analysis by creating what he called a “net oil 
price.”  This measure of oil prices attempts to capture episodes of oil price increases that 
are outside normal market fluctuations.  This measure reflects only those increases in oil 
prices that take the price higher than it has been in the past 12 months.  (Technically, the 
net oil price series is the price of oil for all periods in which the price of oil is higher than 
it has been during the past 12 months, and zero in all other months.)  Hamilton’s own 
research and subsequent research by others find a statistically significant and stable 
negative relationship between the net oil price series and output, while various series 
constructed to reflect episodes of sharp oil price declines do not seem to have any 
explanatory power.  In a related vein, Steven Davis (University of Chicago) and John 
Haltiwanger (University of Maryland) constructed an oil price series that combined 
asymmetry with persistence and also found an asymmetric relationship between oil price 




Classic supply-side effects cannot explain asymmetry.  Operating through supply-
side effects, reductions in oil prices should help output and productivity as increases in   10
oil prices hurt economic output and productivity.  Accordingly, economists have begun to 
explore the channels through which oil prices affect economic activity.  Monetary policy, 
adjustment costs, coordination problems, uncertainty and financial stress, and asymmetry 
in the petroleum product markets have been offered as explanations.  Of these 
explanations, adjustment costs, coordination problems and financial stress seem the most 
consistent with the historical record. 
 
Monetary Policy and Asymmetry 
 
Monetary policy could contribute to an asymmetric response in aggregate 
economic activity to oil price shocks in two different ways.  Monetary policy itself could 
respond to oil price shocks asymmetrically.  Another possibility is that nominal wages are 
sticky downward but not upward, and monetary policy is conducted in such a way that 
nominal GDP falls when oil prices are rising and nominal GDP rises when oil prices are 
falling. 
 
When oil prices rise, real wages must fall to clear markets and restore 
equilibrium.  If real wages do not fall, the economic displacement will be greater. When 
oil prices fall, real wages must rise to clear markets and restore equilibrium. If real wages 
do not rise, the gains in economic activity will be greater.   
 
If nominal wages are sticky downward, an increase in unexpected inflation that is 
at least as great as the decline in real GDP is necessary to yield the necessary reduction in 
real wages.  If the monetary authority maintains a neutral monetary policy, nominal GDP 
is unchanged, prices will rise as much as real GDP falls, and real wages will adjust 
sufficiently.  If the monetary authority conducts policy such that nominal GDP falls, 
however, prices will rise by less than real GDP falls, and because nominal wages are 
sticky downward, real wages will not adjust by enough to restore equilibrium. 
 
Because nominal wages can adjust upward freely, however, unexpected 
disinflation is not required for adjustments in real wages to occur, and the conduct of 
monetary policy is not as important. If the monetary authority conducts policy such that 
nominal GDP rises, prices will rise by more than real GDP falls, but because nominal 
wages adjust freely upward, real wages will rise enough to restore equilibrium.  
Consequently, a monetary policy that results in nominal GDP rising in response to lower 
oil prices will not be as stimulative as a policy that results in nominal GDP falling in 
response to higher oil prices will be contractionary. 
 
John Tatom (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis) provided some early evidence 
that monetary policy responded asymmetrically to oil price shocks by showing that the 
economy responded symmetrically to oil price shocks if the stance of monetary policy is 
taken into account.  In a later contribution, Peter Ferderer (Clark University) showed that 
monetary policy cannot account for the asymmetry in the response of real activity to oil 
price shocks in his model.  More recently, Nathan Balke, Stephen Brown and Mine Yücel 
(Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas) found that the Federal Reserve’s response to oil price 
shocks does not cause asymmetry in real economic activity.  In their model, the   11
asymmetry does not go away—and is in fact is enhanced—when monetary policy (as 
measured by either the fed funds rate or the fed funds rate plus expectations of the fed 
funds rate) is held constant. 
 
Adjustment Costs and Coordination Problems 
 
James Hamilton (University of California, San Diego) contributed the idea that 
adjustment costs could lead to an asymmetric response to changing oil prices.  Rising oil 
prices would retard economic activity directly, and falling oil prices would stimulate 
economic activity directly.  The costs of adjusting to changing oil prices retard economic 
activity whether oil prices are rising or falling. Consequently, rising oil prices result in 
two negative effects on economic activity that reinforce each other.  In the other 
direction, falling oil prices result in both positive and negative effects, which tend to be 
offsetting.  
 
As described above, these adjustment costs can be the result of the energy-to-
output ratio being embedded in the capital or the result of sectoral imbalances.  
Coordination problems could reinforce adjustment costs whether oil prices are rising or 
falling. 
 
Uncertainty and Financial Stress 
 
Uncertainty and financial stress also could contribute to an asymmetric response 
in aggregate economic activity to oil price shocks. As explained by Peter Ferderer (Clark 
University), uncertainty about future oil prices is reflected in increased interest rates and 
reduced investment demand, which adversely affects aggregate economic activity.  In 
addition if the energy-to-output ratio is embedded in the capital stock, firms will find it 
increasingly desirable to postpone irreversible investment decisions until they are more 
certain about future oil prices. 
 
Volatile oil prices contribute to oil price uncertainty and weaker economic 
activity whether oil prices are rising or falling.  As is the case for adjustment costs, 
therefore, uncertainty and financial stress augment the basic supply-side effect when oil 
prices are rising, and offset the basic supply side effect when oil prices are falling.  The 
result is that aggregate economic activity responds to oil price shocks asymmetrically. 
 
Asymmetry in Petroleum Product Prices 
 
Petroleum product prices are another avenue through which the economy may 
respond asymmetrically to fluctuation in crude oil prices.  A considerable body of 
research shows that petroleum product prices themselves respond asymmetrically to 
fluctuations in oil prices, and most of the price volatility originates in crude oil prices 
rather than product prices.  It is a relatively short leap to suggest that asymmetry in the 
response of product prices could account for the asymmetry between crude oil prices and 
aggregate economic activity. 
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Hillard Huntington (Stanford University) has found the economy responds 
symmetrically to changes in petroleum product prices, but that petroleum product prices 
respond asymmetrically to crude oil prices.  The consequence is an asymmetric 
relationship between crude oil prices and aggregate economic activity. These findings 
need further examination, but substantial research shows the asymmetric response of 
aggregate economic activity to oil price shocks arises through channels that cannot be 
explained by the asymmetric response of product prices alone. 
 
Sorting through the Explanations of Asymmetry 
 
Although asymmetry is now fairly well accepted, relatively few studies have 
attempted to distinguish empirically through what channels oil price shocks might yield 
an asymmetric response in aggregate economic activity.  The available research seems to 
rule out the likelihood that asymmetry is the result of monetary policy, but the findings 
are consistent with explanations of asymmetry that rely on adjustment costs, coordination 
problems, or uncertainty and financial risk. 
 
In empirical work published in the Review of Economics and Statistics, Prakash 
Loungani (World Bank) found that oil price shocks lead to a reallocation of labor across 
sectors, which increases the unemployment rate, whether oil prices are rising or falling.  
These sectoral shifts are consistent with adjustment costs and coordination problems, but 
they do not preclude uncertainty and financial risk. 
 
Research by Steven Davis and John Haltiwanger (University of Chicago and 
University of Maryland, respectively) assesses the channels through which oil price 
shocks affect economic activity.  Looking at job destruction and creation in firm level 
data they find that allocative channels (such as, changes in the desired distributions of 
labor and capital) contribute to the asymmetric response of aggregate economic activity 
to oil price shocks.  Again, sectoral shifts are consistent with adjustment costs and 
coordination problems, but they do not preclude uncertainty and financial risk.  In 
addition, Davis and Haltiwanger show that the allocative effects are relatively strong, and 
reinforce the basic supply side effect when oil prices are rising and cancel the basic 
supply side effect when prices are falling. 
 
In research recently published in The Energy Journal, Nathan Balke, Stephen 
Brown and Mine Yücel (Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas) found that monetary policy 
responds asymmetrically because the economy has responded asymmetrically to oil price 
shocks and that monetary policy cannot account for the asymmetry. They also found that 
output and interest rates respond asymmetrically to oil price shocks—with the shocks 
transmitted through asymmetric movements in market interest rates.  Such interest rate 
movements are consistent with several explanations for asymmetry.   Asymmetric 
movements in the interest rates may be indicative of the increased uncertainty and 
financial risk that result from oil price shocks.  Alternatively, movements in market 
interest rates may be a reflection of expectations that oil price shocks will necessitate 
costly adjustments in the future. 
   13
 
V.  A Weakening Relationship 
 
By the mid-1990s, the quantitative relationship between oil prices and economic 
activity seemed fairly robust and reasonably well understood—even if the exact channels 
through which the effects operated were 
not known with certainty.  During the latter 
half of the 1990s, however, the relationship 
seemed to weaken.  In the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, rising in oil prices had less 
effect on economic activity than previous 
research suggest might have been expected.  
 
Rising oil prices led increases in the 
unemployment rate from the early 1970s 
through the early 1990s, and 
unemployment fell with oil prices from 
1982 through 1990 and in the late 1990s 
(Figure 2).  Nonetheless, the relationship 
began weakening in the late 1990s.  
Although oil prices were relatively strong, 
the unemployment rate continued to fall. 
One explanation is that high world oil prices 
were a result of a strong world economy, 
and strong demand rather than a supply shock 
accounted for rising oil prices.  
 
The data also show a weaker 
relationship between rising oil prices and 
core inflation in the late 1990s (Figure 3).  
Mark Hooker (Federal Reserve System, 
Board of Governors) reevaluated the oil 
price-inflation relationship and found that 
since about 1980, oil price changes did not 
seem to affect core measures of inflation. 
Prior to 1980, however, oil price shocks 
contributed substantially to core inflation in 
the United States.  One possibility is that 
U.S. monetary policy in the Volcker and 
Greenspan eras was significantly less 
accommodative to oil price shocks than it had 
been with under their predecessors, and so 
monetary policy no longer contributed to high inflation.   
 
Nonetheless, the relationship between oil prices and interest rates was relatively 














































$/Barrel Figure 3: Real Oil Prices and Core Inflation
Prior to 1980, real oil prices and core inflation were more 
closely related.
Unemployment fell with oil prices from 1982 through 1990 
and in the late 1990s, but the relationship weakened in the 
late 1990s.   14
expected consequence of supply shocks that have greater near-term effects than long-
term effects (Figure 4).  Stephen Brown and Mine Yücel (Federal Reserve Bank of 
Dallas) show that some of the increases in 
the U.S. federal funds rate that occurred in 
1999 and 2000 may have been part of a 
general increase in market interest rates 
that resulted from higher oil prices.   
 
Since about mid-2000, however, 
interest rates have not risen with oil prices.  
This changing relationship may be further 
evidence of an economy that is becoming 
less sensitive to oil price shocks. 
 
Factors Contributing to a 
Weakening Relationship 
 
Several factors likely have 
contributed to a weakening relationship 
between oil prices and economic activity 
over the past three decades.  Among the 
possibilities are a reduced energy-to-GDP 
ratio, the fact that oil price increases were 
the result of increased demand rather than 
oil supply shocks, and prior experience 
with oil price shocks. In addition, the 1990s 
boom was marked by strong productivity 
gains that may have simply obscured the 
relationship between oil prices and 
aggregate economic activity. 
 
A Reduced Energy-to-GDP Ratio 
 
Although it represents a continuing 
trend, the energy-consumption-to-GDP 
ratio declined from the 1970s through the 
early 2000s (Figure 5).  On the basis of this 
decline, Brown and Yücel estimate that the 
U.S. economy could have been about one-third less sensitive to oil price fluctuations in 
2000 than it was in the early 1980s, and about one-half as sensitive as it was in the early 
1970s. 
 
Increased Demand Rather than a Supply Shock 
 
Another factor that could have contributed to a weakening relationship between 
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Figure 5: Energy/GDP Ratio Falling
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The U.S. energy-to-GDP ratio has declined since the end of 
World War II.  Higher energy prices contributed to strong 


























Oil prices and U.S. interest rates moved closely together 
until mid-2000.  15
largely the result of economic expansion.  
Price increases that are the result of 
increased demand increases rather than 
supply shocks may be less disruptive to 
economic activity. 
 
As the result of increased energy 
efficiency, U.S. oil consumption only grew 
moderately during the 1990s, but oil 
consumption in the industrialized nations 
grew steadily during the 1990s (Figure 6). 
World oil consumption was further boosted 
by the dramatic gains in oil consumption 
outside the OECD, with the strongest gains 
in consumption occurring in the newly 
industrializing Asian countries such as 
China and Korea. 
 
In addition, world capacity to 
produce oil did not keep pace with 
growing consumption throughout much of 
the 1990s.  Consequently, the gap 
between OPEC capacity and production 
was relatively small throughout most of 
the 1990s (Figure 7).  With demand 
growing faster than supply, oil prices 
increased in the latter part of the 
decade—though the real increase was 
relatively small by 1980s standards 
(Figure 8, next page).  In 2000, world oil 
demand rose sharply (Figure 9, next 
page), which led to greater consumption 
and a jump in prices.  Because the rise in 
oil prices was the result of strong demand 
from economic expansion, the usual 
decline in economic activity did not follow. 
 
Prior Experience with Energy Price Shocks  
 
Prior experience with oil-price shocks may also have contributed to the muted 
response of U.S. economic activity to oil price shocks.  Such experience may have 
reduced adjustment costs, coordination problems, and uncertainty and financial stress.  In 
addition, monetary authorities have increased experience with oil price shocks, which 
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U.S. oil consumption rose moderately in the 1990s.  Oil 
consumption in the industrialized countries combined rose 
steadily through the 1990s.  The biggest gains in oil 
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OPEC operated fairly close to full capacity in the 1990s.   16
VI.  Conclusions and Implications for Policy 
 
Economic research provides considerable evidence that rising oil prices contribute 
to real GDP losses.  Economic theory suggests a number of channels could account for 
this phenomenon.  The most basic is a 
classic supply-side effect in which rising 
oil prices are indicative of the reduced 
availability of a basic input to production.  
Other channels include reduced aggregate 
demand and contractionary monetary 
policy.  Of these channels, the empirical 
evidence is most consistent with a classic 
supply-side effect.  This effect best 
explains reduced aggregate output, an 
increased price level and higher interest 
rates. 
 
Given the current understanding of 
the way oil price shocks affect economic 
activity, analysts are relatively well positioned 
to prescribe the proper fiscal and monetary 
policy responses to oil price shocks. 
Given that rising oil prices reduces potential 
GDP and the reductions in aggregate 
demand are likely to be negligible, a fiscal 
policy response seems unnecessary.  As far 
as monetary policy is concerned, a neutral 
response to rising oil prices, which consists 
of holding nominal GDP constant, will 
neither aggravate the GDP losses nor offset 
them.  Such a policy will also lead to an 
increase in the price level that is the same 
as the loss in real GDP. 
Beyond taking a neutral stance, 
monetary policy can shape the aggregate 
effects of an oil price shock.  If the 
monetary authority is willing to accept 
higher inflation, it can temporarily boost 
real GDP through an expansionary policy.  
If the monetary authority wants to lessen 
the inflationary consequences of rising oil 
prices, it can tighten policy, which will 
temporarily aggravate the losses in real GDP. 
 
Economists have variously suggested that monetary policy, adjustment costs, 
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Figure 9: Oil Demand Rose Sharply in 2000
The plotted points show the market-clearing prices and 
quantities of oil, 1991-2001.  Increases in quantity and 
price are indicative of increased demand. 
The real oil price shows that the oil price gains in 2000 
were moderate by historical standards.   17
amplification of the basic supply-side effect when oil prices are rising and a lessening of 
the aggregate response when oil prices are falling.  Although recent research seems to 
show that the conduct of U.S. monetary policy has not resulted in such effects, monetary 
policy could have such effects, and the issue is not completely resolved.  Researchers 
have provided evidence that adjustment costs, coordination problems, or increased 
uncertainty and financial stress amplify basic supply-side effects when oil prices are 
rising.  They have not been able to reliably distinguish between these effects. 
 
Because economic research has not been able to distinguish between the 
contributions of adjustment costs, coordination problems, and uncertainty and financial 
stress, analysts are less able to prescribe the best course of action for energy policy.  In 
particular, research has not yet determined whether the private sector is capable of 
providing the optimal level of insurance against price shocks.  Given the possibility of 
coordination problems across industries and the asymmetric response of aggregate 
economic activity to oil price shocks, an energy policy that leans against movements in 
international oil prices would seem justified.  Nonetheless, considerably more research 
needs to be conducted before economists can provide sound guidance as to how far 
policymakers should go to reduce an economy’s vulnerability to oil price shocks. 
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Glossary of Terms: 
 
Aggregate Channels – changes in economic activity that work through changes in 
aggregate supply or demand. 
Aggregate Economic Activity – the sum total of economic activity in a country, which is 
commonly measured by gross domestic product (GDP). 
Allocative Channels – changes in economic activity that work through changes in the 
composition of output. 
Asymmetry – a process in which aggregate economic activity is reduced by more by an 
oil price increase than it is increased by an oil price decrease. 
Business Cycles – fluctuations in aggregate economic activity. 
Consumption Smoothing – the process of adjusting consumption spending to lifetime 
income by holding consumption relatively constant when there are short-term 
fluctuations in income. 
Core Inflation – a measure of inflation that is thought to provide a better signal of 
underlying inflationary pressure because it excludes food and energy prices, which are 
quite volatile. 
Federal Funds Rate – The interest rate at which commercial banks borrow from each 
other reserves that are on deposit with the Federal Reserve System. 
Net Oil Price – an oil price series that captures no price decreases and only those 
increases that take the price of oil higher than it has been during the past year. 
Neutral Monetary Policy – is the conduct of monetary policy in such a way that it has no 
effect on economic activity.  According to Robert Gordon of Northwestern University, a 
neutral monetary policy leaves nominal GDP unchanged.  According to Milton Friedman, 
who is retired from the University of Chicago, a neutral monetary policy requires that the 
money supply be unchanged.  Many other economists regard a constant federal funds rate 
as neutral monetary policy.  In the absence of aggregate supply shocks, all three 
definitions of neutrality are consistent with each other.  Aggregate supply shocks can 
cause a divergence between these three measures of monetary neutrality. 
Oil Price Shock – a sharp change in the price of oil. 
Putty-Clay Technology – is technology in which the energy-to-output, capital-to-output, 
and labor-to-output ratios can be varied over the long run as capital is purchased and 
installed but cannot be changed in the short run because they are embedded in the capital 
stock. 
Real Interest Rate – the market interest rate minus expected inflation. 
Sticky Wages and Prices – the inability of market forces to change wages and prices.  
This stickiness usually occurs when market forces would reduce nominal wages and 
prices. 